

Imperatives in concessive clauses: compatibility between constructions

Hidemitsu Takahashi

Hokkaido University

Abstract

In his pioneering paper on “Performative Subordinate Clauses,” Lakoff (1984) claimed that subordinate clauses expressing a reason or concession allow imperatives conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). While this analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, the present paper shows that Lakoff’s analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative utterances they permit. Contra Lakoff, concessive clauses with *although*, *though* and *except (that)* do allow imperative constructions conveying directive illocutionary forces to occur, whereas by contrast those with *even though* tend to disallow both types of imperatives.

These findings can be explained in terms of compatibility between “component” constructions constituting a complex sentence. It is argued that the compatibility between imperatives (both directive and assertive types) and concessive adverbials (excluding *even though*) can be attributed to the latter’s loose integration into a matrix clause required by the former. Furthermore, it is argued that the incompatibility of *even though* with imperatives arises primarily from the incompatibility between the tight integration of *even though* and the loose integration required by imperatives, together with the associated incompatibility between the non-rectifying function of *even though* and the rectifying conjunction favored by imperatives.

1. Introduction

This paper discusses English imperatives in subordinate clauses, with a special focus on those occurring in concessive clauses.¹ It is a received wisdom that the imperative normally occurs in main clauses. In fact, linguists have not paid much attention to imperatives used in subordinate clauses. The common (though not necessarily correct) assumption is that

¹ This paper represents a revised and expanded account of research introduced in Takahashi 2005. An earlier version was also presented at the 4th International Conference on Construction Grammar, held at Tokyo University in September 2006. I am indebted to the editors of this journal and two reviewers for their critical comments and suggestions. Thanks also go to Haruhiko Ono, Hiroshi Goto, Yasuo Ueyama, and Hiroshi Ohashi for helpful advice, as well as Charalabos Kalpakidis and the editors of this journal for stylistic improvements. I am solely responsible for any inadequacies that remain.

adverbial conjuncts in English such as *if*, *when*, *because*, and *although* are always followed by declaratives as in (1), but not by non-declarative sentences, as demonstrated in the oddity of each sentence in (2) below:

- (1a) She will get upset if I exclude her.
- (1b) She got upset when I told her she must leave.
- (1c) She got upset because she lost her wallet.
- (1d) She got upset, although I didn't exclude her.

- (2a) *She will get upset if *exclude her!*
- (2b) *She will get upset when *exclude her!*
- (2c) *She got upset because *did you exclude her?*
- (2d) *She will get upset, although *don't exclude her!*

The basic supposition is straightforward. Non-declaratives are main clause phenomena and therefore should not be allowed in subordinate clauses.

In his 1984 paper, however, Lakoff contends that main clause phenomena including the imperative do occur in some adverbial subordinate clauses, and that when they occur they are restricted to those conveying statements. Consider:

- (3a) *I'm staying because go home!
(Lakoff 1984: 475)
- (3b) *I'm leaving because find out which girl pinched me.
(ibid: 476)
- (3c) I'm staying because consider which girl pinched me.
(ibid: 476)

While each sentence in (3) contains a *because* occurring with an imperative clause, only (3c) is acceptable. Sentences (3a) and (3b) are ruled out, because, according to Lakoff, only speech act constructions that conventionally express statements felicitously occur in *because* clauses. That is, the imperative utterance *go home* in (3a) or *find out* in (3b) is interpreted as a directive speech act. In contrast, the imperative *consider which girl pinched*

me in (3c) is functionally a statement, because the *because* clause assumes that the addressee knows the answer to the question *which girl pinched the speaker?* Lakoff generalizes that imperatives felicitously occurring in *because* clauses are those conventionally expressing statements such as (3c) as opposed to ordinary imperatives such as (3a) and (3b) (cf. Lakoff 1984: 476). More generally, he maintains that clauses expressing a reason or concession allow speech act constructions conveying statements (ibid: 479).

The present paper examines the validity of Lakoff's generalization as it applies to the imperative in concessive adverbial clauses in naturally occurring data. Based on a survey of written materials taken from electronic corpora, the paper argues the following points. First, Lakoff's analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative clauses they permit. Contrary to Lakoff's claim, concessive clauses with *although*, *though*, and *except (that)* do allow imperatives conveying directive illocutionary forces; imperatives do not need to convey assertive forces (or statements) to be felicitously embedded by concessive adverbials. Next, not all concessive clauses equally allow the imperative – *even though* does not as readily allow the imperative. Third, in conformity with Lakoff's generalization, the types of imperative utterances permitted by reason clauses are those in assertive (= rhetorical) usage, although the verbs seem restricted to the class of "cognition verbs" such as *consider*, *don't forget*, *remember*, and *bear in mind*.

This paper distinguishes itself from the previous literature in two important respects. First of all, it regards both the imperative and the adverbial subordinate clause as constructions – conventional patterns of linguistic structure imbued with features of interpretation and discourse function (cf. Goldberg 1995, 2006; Diessel 2004). Second, the paper explains the possibility of embedding imperatives in terms of constructional compatibility, by exploring the view that the felicity of a complex construction crucially depends on the compatibility between its "component" constructions. Specifically, the

discussions put forward the following points. First, imperatives, both ordinary and rhetorical, are permitted by the concessive adverbials *(al)though* and *except (that)*, because the latter provide a conceptually independent environment required by the former. Rhetorical imperatives are permitted by reason adverbials, because they are less independent than ordinary (= non-rhetorical) imperatives. *Even though* clauses do not readily allow imperatives because of a serious clash in syntactic integration together with their discourse function. The *even though* clause is tightly integrated into, and solely serves to emphasize, a main clause, whereas the imperative clause demands a “loose” syntactic environment and prefers a concessive conjunction rectifying (as opposed to emphasizing) the content of a main clause.

Section 2 briefly surveys previous research. Section 3 deals with imperatives in concessive adverbial clauses. Section 4 discusses imperatives in reason clauses. Section 5 outlines the constructional approach of the present paper (5.1) and explains two main findings obtained in sections 3 and 4 in terms of constructional compatibility (5.2 and 5.3).

2. Previous research

The traditional view holds that imperatives should not normally occur in subordinate clauses both in English and in other languages. In fact, most linguists have not paid serious attention to imperatives in subordinate clauses. According to Foley and Van Valin (1984: 249), for instance, “... the subordinate clause may not be independently specified for illocutionary force”; hence, the imperative *kiss me* does not occur with an adverbial clause:

(4) *I’ll scream because/after/if kiss me!

In a similar vein, Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 174) point out that “imperatives tend not to occur as dependent clauses,” hence there are no clear examples of a marker of imperativity functioning as a complementizer. Crosslinguistic research reveals that in

languages with distinct imperative morphology, the imperative is excluded from dependent clauses.

It is widely believed that whereas coordinate clauses are independent speech acts, (adverbial) subordinate clauses normally lack illocutionary force (cf. Haiman & Thompson 1984; Lehmann 1988: 193; Cristofaro 2003, among others). This belief persists even in a most recent reference grammar book such as Huddleston and Pullum (2002), who hold that imperatives are normally restricted to main clauses, so sentences like the following,

- (5) It's time we were going home, because don't forget we have to be up early in the morning.

are “of somewhat marginal grammaticality” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 854).

Lakoff (1984) takes a significantly different perspective on this issue. He demonstrates that reason and concessive clauses do permit speech act constructions including inverted exclamations, *wh*-exclamations, rhetorical questions, tags as well as imperatives, all of which are “constructions that are restricted in their use to expressing certain illocutionary forces that are specified as part of the grammar of English” (Lakoff 1984: 473). Lakoff's main claims directly relevant to the present paper can be summarized as follows. First, imperatives (and all the other speech act constructions) are permitted in reason (*because, since*) and concessive (*although, though, except*) clauses, but not in other adverbial clauses (such as conditional and temporal). Second, reason and concessive clauses can be subsumed under a single class of “reason clauses,” in that “concessive clauses give reasons for the opposite of the main clause” (cf. *ibid*: 479). That is, in “A although B”, B normally provides a reason for **not** A; to take an instance of *John stayed up although he was tired*, John's being tired would be a reason for his not staying up.

Third, not all reason and concessive clauses permit imperatives (and other speech act constructions). Only those conveying statements permit them. Lakoff ultimately offers the following as a general principle:

- (6) Clauses expressing a reason allow speech act constructions that convey statements, and the content of the statement equals the reason expressed.
(ibid: 479)

Consider (3a), (3b) and (3c) again, repeated here for convenience as (7a), (7b) and (7c), respectively:

- (7a) *I'm staying because go home!
(7b) *I'm leaving because find out which girl pinched me.
(7c) I'm staying because consider which girl pinched me.

All these sentences contain an imperative beginning with a *because*. While both (7a) and (7b) are ruled out, only (7c) is acceptable because this sentence conveys a statement.

This analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, as evidenced by the fact that it is closely followed in a recent study by Verstraete (2005), who remarks that “coordinate” *because* and *although* as well as *for* impose rhetorical interpretations on non-declarative clause types (Verstraete 2005: 621):

- (8) I only make US\$ 6000 in the whole year, and even like the next two years, I was just like getting by, because don't forget that our expenses are very high.
(example 19 in Verstraete 2005)

The second sentence can be interpreted as communicating that “(I was just like getting by) because our expenses are very high,” which is functionally a statement. Just like Lakoff (1984), Verstraete assumes that to permit the imperative construction, *for*, *because* and *although* clauses must convey assertive illocutionary force, since “the speech act in the

secondary clause is invariably assertive,” whereas the speech act in the main clause has no inherent restrictions (cf. Verstraete 2005: 621-622).

Lakoff offers a variety of (constructed) examples in which subordinate clauses beginning with *although* and *except* permit speech act constructions including inverted exclamations, tags, and rhetorical questions. However, he does not provide any example of these concessive clauses allowing imperatives to occur.

The next section deals with imperatives in concessive clauses and presents numerous counterexamples to Lakoff’s claim that imperatives must be functionally statements (i.e. in rhetorical use) to be permitted in reason and concessive clauses.

3. Imperatives in concessive clauses

As we have observed above, according to Lakoff’s analysis (1984), imperatives permitted by concessive clauses should be those conveying statements or “assertive illocutionary force” (Verstraete 2005). However, Mizuno (2005, in preparation) presents a few counterexamples such as those in (9) and (10) below:

- (9) The fresh peach had been poached in chamomile tea and each gave a little of itself to the other (...) Now, with cold weather upon us, peaches and other fresh, locally grown stone fruit are out – **although** *please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner*, if by some miracle, you come upon some decent peaches in your supermarket.

(*The Washington Post*, January 16, 2002, example from Mizuno 2005: 68)

- (10) Toshiba Matsushita Display Technology has already shown a 17-inch XGA wide-polymer OLED display, **although** *don’t expect to see one in your local store* – or on the sleeve of your shirt – for some time yet.

(*The Age* (Melbourne), July 3, 2003, example from Mizuno, in preparation)²

² According to Mizuno (2005, in preparation), the imperative may occur even with preposed *although* as well, but the occurrence is limited:

- (i) Although please don’t go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.
- (ii) ?Although never go telling your sister this, I think her cat is ugly.

It is clear, as Mizuno observes, that the imperative *please do try the chamomile-peach combination this summer or sooner* in (9) or *don't expect to see one in your local store* in (10) is construed as conveying a directive speech act rather than a statement, hence it is non-rhetorical in function.

In fact, it is not particularly hard to find similar examples. Observe:

- (11) We assume you have no intention of reporting your son, **although** if you are concerned about the children's welfare, *please reconsider*.
(*Annie's Mailbox, Creators Syndicate, December 16, 2003*)

Here, the imperative verb *reconsider* is politely and seriously suggesting an action on the part of the recipient of this letter; hence it can be classified in terms of non-rhetorical use.

Other concessive adverbials such as *except (that)* and *though* also permit imperatives used non-rhetorically.³ Such examples are typically found in written (notably, journalistic) discourse. This is at least partly due to the tendency that *but* constructions are predominant for the expression of concession in spoken language and the realization of concessive adverbials is relatively rare, although, of course, this does not mean that concessive adverbials do not occur in speech (cf. Barth 2000).⁴

Sentence (i) is perfectly acceptable, but (ii) is unacceptable presumably due to the presence of the emphatic negative operator *never*.

³ Matthiessen and Thompson (1988: 277), for example, explicitly classify *except that* as an instance of concessive connective along with *although* and *even though*. In their framework, concessive is one of seven distinct "circumstantial relations"; the other six relations include temporal, conditional, reason, purpose, means, and manner. In other works, the treatment of *except (that)* is not so clear-cut. Thus, Quirk et al. (1985: 645) do not label it as a concessive adverbial but as a conditional instead, explaining that "*Except* is used without *that* in the sense 'unless'" (ibid: 999, note).

⁴ Barth (2000) enumerates three reasons for the predominance of coordinate constructions over *although* constructions for the expression of concession in spoken language. They include on-line production, room to manoeuvre (saving the speaker's face), and politeness (saving the interlocutor's face) (Barth 2000: 418-420). However, Barth distinguishes four distinct discourse functions of *although* constructions when they (rarely) *Constructions 2/2008* (www.constructions-online.de, urn:nbn:de:0009-4-12809, ISSN 1860-2010)

Observe in (12) below the use of *except* clauses permitting imperative utterances:

- (12a) Current Texas law provides that parents have the right to use corporal punishment to reasonably discipline their children. What’s wrong with that? Nothing – **except** if you are looking for that provision, *don’t look in the Texas Family Code*. Look in the Texas Penal Code. You’ll find that the corporal punishment provision is in the Penal Code as a defense to child abuse. As a defense to child abuse, that’s what’s offensive to most parents. HB 383 would simply move the provision to the Family Code. No more, no less.
(*The Seattle Times*, February 25, 2005)
- (12b) He made two calls to his mother, concerned about the children. He wrote letters, setting up a cover story in which he claimed to have surprised an intruder in the house: two were to his brother-in-law, William Shand Kydd. Mrs. Maxwell Scott posted them for him. Lucan then wrote a third to Michael Stoop, alluding to a “traumatic night of unbelievable circumstances”. It included the astonishing line, “I won’t bore you, **except** when you come across my children *please tell them* that you knew me and all I care about is them.” The words have a goodbye ring. When Stoop received the letter he passed it on to the police, telling them he hadn’t kept the envelope or noted the postmark.
(*The Sunday Telegraph* (London), October 10, 2004)
- (12c) Then a spoken-word poet stood onstage and waved her arms around and riffed on the Con-stitution, the coun-try, coun-ter-revolutions – **except** in each of those c-words, *please insert the naughty c-word*. (The one we’re not supposed to say in print.)
(*The Washington Post*, April 26, 2004)
- (12d) Johnson has always coached with that same sort of certitude. He worked at Washington from 1989-92 under the difficult regime of Lynn Nance, a period of dark times for the Huskies – **except** *don’t tell Johnson that*. He’s fiercely loyal to Nance and says he learned more from him than anybody except Mike Montgomery, his predecessor at Stanford.
(November 19, 2004, *The Seattle Times*)
- (12e) “I don’t know what to tell you, Maggie, **except** *just be yourself*,” he told her.
(*The New York Times*, March 15, 2006)

occur in spoken English. That is, they are used to restrict previous claims, introduce additional information, forestall possible objections, or summarize the previous exchange of arguments (Barth 2000: 420-432).

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It is clear that the imperatives *don't look in the Texas Family Code* in (12a), *please tell them that you knew me...* (12b), and *please insert the naughty c-word* in (12c) as well as the imperative *don't tell Johnson that* in (12d) convey directive illocutionary force, not an assertion. The imperative *Just be yourself* in (12e) is also interpreted as expressing advice or an instruction – it is hardly used rhetorically.

Though also readily permits the imperative, as illustrated below:

(13a) Pittsburgh had more fun in Coach Jamie Dixon's rookie season, **though** *don't blame its problems on a "sophomore jinx."* The competition in the Big East Conference, not superstition, has made things difficult for the Panthers, the second-year coach said. Pittsburgh has struggled again recently in Big East play after a strong stretch, but such is life in the nation's deepest conference.

(*Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 2005)

(13b) A WELCOME return to northerly winds will guarantee improved beach weather and water surface conditions. The swell is only small, averaging around 0.5m, initially from the east-southeast, but tending more east to northeast later. Winds will be light northwesterly early, ensuring the small waves will be clean. Nor'easters will kick in by mid-morning and become fresh during the afternoon. The northern ends of beaches will be the pick **though** *don't expect much power.*

(*The Daily Telegraph* (Sydney, Australia), February 18, 2005)

(13c) But where does one put such an enormous number of shoes, frocks and sweaters, jackets and jeans, coats and scarves? For, regardless of financial circumstances, we girls will always have more clothes than we know what to do with (**though** *please don't tell my husband*).

(*The Daily Telegraph* (London), October 30, 2004)

(13d) At the same time, while vote tallies might win elections, they matter little in intellectual discourse. We have no problems with, say, professors of finance, marketing or management – **though** *please don't ask* how someone who never solved any problems in these domains for any businesses, ever, gets such a title – presenting their views not just on economic and financial issues, but on the Middle East.

(*The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), June 6, 2004)

(13e) Does Shakespeare really need this sort of help? Are we so incapable of engaging with this poetry that we have to have the equivalent of canned laughter to give us permission to emote? Can Dench not deliver these lines unaided? It implies less

than full confidence in the power of the play and players that the audience should have their emotions hoicked around in this undignified manner. It's not just the RSC (**though** *please don't get me on to the women's "feisty" song*, accompanied by kitchen utensils, in the RSC's *Tamer Tamed*). There's an underlying problem: the world of sophisticated contemporary music seems barely to touch that of contemporary theatre.

(*The Guardian* (London), March 18, 2004)

- (13f) You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle, **though** if your house burns down, *please don't write in*. Cedar (available as oil, chips, blocks, balls and drawer liners) is a classic repellent. Moth eggs are killed by tumble drying and dry cleaning.

(*The Guardian* (London), July 24, 2004)

Just like *although* and *except (that)*, the data involving embedded imperatives under *though* are of two types. In one case, the imperative combines directly with the concessive conjunction (cf. (13a-e)). In the other, the conjunction *though* combines with another adverbial clause (such as an *if* conditional), which includes an imperative as main clause (cf. (13f)).⁵ In either case, the imperative clauses in these *though* clauses are used non-rhetorically; they are not interpreted as conveying statements at all.

Next, let us compare *though* with *even though*. While *even though* is sometimes treated as a mere emphatic form of *though* (cf. Quirk et al 1985: 1099; Schourup & Waida 1988: 203; Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 736), the two versions show a sharp contrast in the possibility of integrating the imperative. The above sequences containing a *though* clause become far less acceptable if *even* is added, as illustrated below:

⁵ I owe this observation to a reviewer of this journal, who also provided me with the following example involving a temporal, instead of a conditional, clause and suggested that example (13f) above does not support my point:

- (i) You seem to have all the luck in the world, though when you get married next week, don't neglect your old friends.

In actuality, however, both (13f) and example (i) above do support my claim, since what is at issue here is the possibility of embedded imperatives in non-rhetorical use under the concessive conjunction *though*.

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- (13a') Pittsburgh had more fun in Coach Jamie Dixon's rookie season, **?even though** *don't blame its problems on a "sophomore jinx."*
- (13b') (...) Nor'easters will kick in by mid-morning and become fresh during the afternoon. The northern ends of beaches will be the pick **?even though** *don't expect much power.*
- (13c') (...) But where does one put such an enormous number of shoes, frocks and sweaters, jackets and jeans, coats and scarves? For, regardless of financial circumstances, we girls will always have more clothes than we know what to do with (**?even though** *please don't tell my husband*).
- (13d') (...) At the same time, while vote tallies might win elections, they matter little in intellectual discourse. We have no problems with, say, professors of finance, marketing or management – **?even though** *please don't ask* how someone who never solved any problems in these domains for any businesses, ever, gets such a title – presenting their views not just on economic and financial issues, but on the Middle East.
- (13e') (...) Can Dench not deliver these lines unaided? It implies less than full confidence in the power of the play and players that the audience should have their emotions hoicked around in this undignified manner. It's not just the RSC (**?even though** *please don't get me on to the women's "feisty" song*, accompanied by kitchen utensils, in the RSC's *Tamer Tamed*). There's an underlying problem: the world of sophisticated contemporary music seems barely to touch that of contemporary theatre.
- (13f') (...) You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle, **?even though** if your house burns down, *please don't write in.*

In stark contrast with other concessive adverbials *though*, *although*, and *except (that)*, *even though* generally disallows the imperative to occur.

So far, we have witnessed examples of concessive adverbials permitting ordinary (i.e. non-rhetorical) imperatives. It must be added that one can also find examples of concessive adverbials permitting imperatives expressing assertive force, as predicted by Lakoff's 1984 analysis. The following is one such example with *except that*.

- (14) HDMI (High-Definition Multimedia Interface) is another way to get digital video from player to display, but it also carries digital audio. It has a smaller, neater plug. An adapter cable can feed a HDMI video signal to a DVI input and vice versa. HDCP (High Definition Compatible Digital) is a copy protection system. The details don't matter much, **except that** *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP. If you're buying a projector with a DVI input, make sure the brochure says "HDCP compliant".
(*Herald Sun* (Melbourne, Australia), October 20, 2004)

In this example, the imperative *be aware* is used rhetorically, serving as a reminder. In other words, the entire adverbial clause is functionally a statement, since it can be paraphrased as "The details don't matter much, except that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP."

Note that in the context of (14), *(al)though* can readily replace *except that*:

- (14a') The details don't matter much, **(al)though** *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

However, *even though* cannot:

- (14b') ?The details don't matter much, **even though** *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

The same contrast in acceptability can be discerned between *though* and *even though* in the following constructed example of rhetorical imperative with the form *don't forget*:

- (15a) You should ask Harry for help, *though* don't forget that he is busy.
(15b) ?You should ask Harry for help, *even though* don't forget that he is busy.

One may generalize then that *even though* tends to disallow the imperative construction – both in ordinary (non-rhetorical) and rhetorical use.

Let me summarize the findings in this section. First, contra Lakoff (1984) (as well as Verstraete 2005), concessive adverbial clauses permit not only rhetorical imperatives but

also ordinary (= non-rhetorical) imperatives. Second, *even though* clauses tend to repel both rhetorical and ordinary imperatives.

4. English imperatives in reason clauses

This section discusses the use of imperative clauses embedded in reason clauses.

Lakoff (1984) offers one example of *because* permitting the imperative verb *consider* (example (3c) or (7c)). Verstraete (2005) provides an example of *because* with *don't forget* (example (8) in the present paper). Similar examples can readily be found with the same verbs, as illustrated below:

(16a) 'It will never end until we feel our powers, until we see how few and weak they are'; (this was the merest wishfulness); and how strong they are, **for** *consider* what they have now, and in what sort of a country we are living.

(BNC. Mitchell, David (1991) *Winning karate competition*. London: A & C Black Publishers Ltd. 10-108.)

(16b) Depressed people, whether they're police officers or men or women or kids, are at great risk for doing harm to themselves and others. And the more access they have to weapons, the more likely they are to translate that depression and sadness, and in this boy's case rage **because** *don't forget* that most boys are taught it's better to be mad than to be sad.

(*Red Lake Indian Reservation News*, March 24, 2005)

In full conformity with both Lakoff's and Verstraete's prediction, these reason clauses are making statements rather than conveying directive forces. Sentence (16b), for example, can be paraphrased as a *because* clause followed by a declarative: "And the more access they have to weapons, the more likely they are to translate that depression and sadness, and in this boy's case rage **because** most boys are taught it's better to be mad than to be sad."⁶

⁶ Based on the binary distinction between causal and inferential uses of *because* (cf. Hirose 1991), Kanetani (2005: 23) claims that only the "inferential," as opposed to "causal," *because* clauses permit main clause phenomena such as (i):

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As the examples below show, all the imperative verbs found in reason clauses in on-line corpora are what might be termed as “cognition verbs” (cf. Declerck 1991: 168). Included are *remember*, *bear in mind*, *never forget*, and *believe (me)*:

(17a) ... my only view is that, er, the reason is that, by the time it saw the light of day, **because** *remember*, the manuscript was in the, the manuscript was physically in the possession of the Bullitt family not the Freud family.

(BNC, London School of Economics: lecture on the psychoanalytical study of society. Recorded on 21 January 1993)

(17b) I don't know er why we're not more continually erm more on the case as far as our members of parliament are concerned **because** *remember* they're there for our benefit and front page of the Daily Mirror this morning.

(BNC, James Whale Phone-in: radio broadcast (Leisure). Recorded on 30 October 1993)

(i) I'm leaving, because here comes my bus.

(Lakoff 1987: 473)

(example 13a in Kanetani 2005)

Kanetani assumes that an adverbial clause is allowed to perform an illocutionary act separated from its main clause only in “inferential” constructions.

However, the facts do not seem so straightforward. For one thing, it is far from clear whether a sentence like (i) above unambiguously classifies as an “inferential” construction. Kanetani (2005: 23-24) treats (iia) as an instance of causal *because*, and (iib) as inferential:

(iia) The ground is wet because it has rained.

(example 4a in Kanetani 2005)

(Causal use) in S(entence)² because S1, S1 is a cause of P(roposition)²

(iib) It has rained, because the ground is wet.

(example 10a in Kanetani 2005)

(Inferential use) in S2, because S1, P1 is a premise from which to draw the conclusion that P2

If one closely follows this criterion, sentence (i) above might as well be analyzed as causal, rather than inferential, use of *because*, in that the bus's coming can be interpreted as a direct cause of my leaving. In fact, many of my own examples of *because* permitting imperatives classify as causal rather than inferential. For instance, consider (17d):

(iii) (...) we support the Party, we pay for the Party, we have a right to democracy in the Party
(= (17d)) **because** *never forget* it is our Party too, I move.

(17d) can be better analyzed in terms of causal *because*, in that S1 (*(never forget) it is our Party too*) is a cause of S2 (*we support the Party, we pay for the Party, we have a right to democracy in the Party*). Not much inference seems involved in this sequence.

- (17c) Well, no I'm trying to help you **because** *bear in mind* that if you are interviewed, that is a possible question.
(BNC, Environmental Health Officers' conference: lecture. Recorded on [date unknown])
- (17d) We've heard the voice of the Party professionals, we've heard the voice of the Labour leadership, now let's all speak on behalf of the ordinary trade unionists and say with all the force that is necessary on behalf of those millions, men and women, young and old, we support the Party, we pay for the Party, we have a right to democracy in the Party **because** *never forget* it is our Party too, I move.
(BNC, Trade Union Annual Congress (Business). Recorded on 7 June 1993)
- (17e) At this point I found myself wondering how anything so ugly could be so beautiful **for** *believe me* that one cat had stirred a new urge in me, the excitement of catching something totally new.
(BNC, *Coarse Fisherman*. UK: Metrocrest Ltd, 1989, no page)
- (17f) He says I come on too strong with these men, not sexually **because** *believe me*, I don't.
(BNC, *The Daily Mirror*. London: Mirror Group Newspapers, 1992, no page)
- (17g) And er the reason we took the biggest jug we could find it wasn't so much to feed two children in the house you're parents also wanted a bowl **because** *believe me* in those times we were we were hungry, we were dear, very very hungry.
(BNC, Nottingham Oral History Project: interview (Leisure). Recorded on [date unknown])

Note that all these examples convey statements, with the imperative verb serving as a reminder. Some (or, in fact, many) of the imperative verbs above are parenthetically used – in particular, in (17a), (17b), (17f), and (17g). In short, Lakoff's prediction (1984) is confirmed by naturally occurring data as far as reason adverbials are concerned, in that reason clauses permitting imperatives are those conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). What is newly found here is the fact that the verb type is restricted to the one of “cognition verbs” that is in rhetorical use, as exemplified by *consider* and *don't forget* as well as *remember*, *bear in mind*, *never forget*, and *believe me*.

5. Explaining the findings: compatibility between component constructions

The table below summarizes the main findings presented in sections 3 and 4.

	plain declarative	rhetorical imperative	ordinary imperative
<i>because</i>	√	√	?
<i>(al)though</i>	√	√	√
<i>except (that)</i>	√	√	√
<i>even though</i>	√	?	?

Table 1. Distribution of clause types vs. reason and concessive adverbials

As shown in this table, the first main finding is that concessive adverbial clauses with *(al)though* and *except (that)* allow both rhetorical and ordinary imperatives, quite unlike reason (i.e. *because*) clauses only allowing rhetorical (as opposed to ordinary) imperatives. The second finding is that, in stark contrast with other concessive clauses, *even though* does not readily combine with the imperative at all.

This section presents an account for each of these findings from the perspective of compatibility between constructions. Section 5.1 outlines a general idea of constructional compatibility involving a complex sentential expression. It is argued in section 5.2 that the first finding, i.e. the felicity of two types of imperatives under concessive adverbial clauses, can be explained as a case of compatibility between the former and the latter – the two are compatible in terms of syntactic independence. Next, in section 5.3, we explain the second finding, i.e. the difficulty of *even though* clauses to embed imperatives, as a case of incompatibility (or “clash”) between constructions. The two constructions do not merge because of a difference in conceptual integration, together with differences in their associated functional features.

5.1 *Compatibility between constructions*

The theoretical framework adopted in this paper is based on recent work in construction grammar and, more broadly, cognitive linguistics. Most importantly, it is assumed here that constructions are the basic units of grammar (cf. Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor 1988; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987; Fillmore & Kay 1993; Goldberg 1995; Croft 2001, among others). Furthermore, it is assumed that all grammatical assemblies are treated as constructions – conventionalized symbolic units comprised of a particular form paired with a specific meaning or discourse function (cf. Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987; Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor 1988; Goldberg 2006). Next, constructions are construed to vary in size, complexity and abstractness (cf. Tomasello 2003: 100-101; Goldberg 2006: 5). Morphemes like the plural form *-s* and the prefix form *un-*, for example, are among the smallest, simplest and the most specific constructions, whereas the ditransitive (Subj V Obj₁ Obj₂) and the passive (Subj aux VP_{pp} (PP_{by})) are instances of larger, more complex and highly abstract constructions (cf. Diessel 2004: 16-18; Tomasello 2003: 100-101; Goldberg 2006: 5).

A basic axiom that is adopted here is that the imperative is one such construction in language, which is relatively large and highly complex in semantic import. That is, viewed as a construction, the imperative is prototypically associated with the speaker's (as causer-like agent) exerting varying degrees of (normally strong) force toward the addressee (as causee-like agent) who may thereby perform some action (cf. Takahashi 1994, 2000, 2004), as exemplified in *Just give me a call* or *Come in*. In discourse functional terms, the imperative is typically (though not necessarily) associated with directive speech acts (cf. Searle 1969). The concessive clause can also be considered as a construction, which is large, complex and highly abstract in meaning. Concessive clauses as a whole are typically associated with some kind of contrast between two or more state of affairs (cf. Halliday & Hasan 1976; König 1988, 1994; Sweetser 1990; Izutsu 2006; Mizuno, in preparation).

We have seen a growing number of studies addressing how constructions are related with one another, and how they are acquired by young children, as well as how and why generalizations are learned and constrained (cf. Tomasello 2003; Diessel 2004; Goldberg 2006, among others). Less studied is what I term the issue of compatibility between constructions, which refers to why two (or more) constructions can and cannot be felicitously combined, as well as how two (or more) constructions are constrained in order to be felicitously combined. The idea itself is briefly addressed in Goldberg (2006: 10, 21-22), who proposes that (I) an actual linguistic expression is typically analyzable as the amalgam of several distinct constructions; (II) constructions are combined freely to form actual expressions as long as they are not in conflict; and (III) unsolved conflicts between constructions result in judgments of ill-formedness. Goldberg maintains that these aspects of constructions are critically important in accounting for the infinitely creative potential of language (cf. *ibid*: 22). She illustrates the cases of (II) above mostly with such mono-clausal constructions as *what did Liza buy Zach?* which is analyzed in terms of several constructions, notably, ditransitive, interrogative, subject-auxiliary inversion, VP and NP constructions, among others. However, the cases of “unsolved conflicts” in (III) are neither fully illustrated nor analyzed.

The present section applies this perspective of constructional compatibility in order to explain the possibility of subordinated imperatives we are considering. Specifically, I would like to clarify why imperatives are compatible with *(al)though* or *except (that)* clauses, and also why imperatives are incompatible with *even though* clauses. In so doing, we delve into the exact nature of (potential) conflicts involved in imperatives subordinated under concessive adverbial clauses.

Consider a simple imperative sentence like (18) below:

(18) Call me later.

- (19a) Imperative construction
- (19b) Transitive construction
- (19c) Active construction

As spelled out in (19) above, sentence (18) involves at least three constructions: imperative, transitive and active. This sentence is perfectly acceptable because these three constructions are conceptually in full harmony. Most notably, each construction shares the conception of an agentive subject engaged in some dynamic action in its standard usage (cf. Takahashi 2000). This I would label as a case of no potential conflict in construction.

Compare the awkward sentence (20) below, which is comprised of at least three component constructions listed in (21):

(20) ?Be called later.

- (21a) Imperative construction
- (21b) Transitive construction
- (21c) Passive construction

The infelicity of sentence (20) can be construed to result from a clash between the imperative and the passive. Specifically, the imperative normally requires an (causer-like) agentive subject as in *Come in* whereas the passive typically demands a patient subject as in *She was taken to a hospital* (cf. Takahashi 2000, 2004). However, see the perfectly acceptable passive imperative sentence (22) below involving exactly the same three constructions listed in (21) above:

(22) Just be flattered by what he says; it'll make his day.

Quite unlike (20) above, the (potential) conflict between the imperative and the passive is perfectly solved. Here, the imperative radically departs from its prototype – in particular, the implicit subject of (22) is construed as being less agentive and more

experiencer-like than in sentence (20) above. As a result, the passive comfortably merges into this imperative construction. Given these analyses, we might view sentence (20) as a case of unsolved conflicts between the two relevant component constructions, and sentence (22) as one of settled conflicts.

In the following two sections, we apply this approach to the problems of subordinated imperatives under different types of concessive adverbial clauses. As a brief illustration, compare the acceptable subordinated imperative sentence (23) involving the conjunction *though* with the unacceptable sentence (25) involving *even though* below:

(23) You should ask Harry for help, though don't forget that he is busy.

(24a) Subordinate construction (*Though* concessive adverbial construction)

(24b) Imperative construction

(25) ?You should ask Harry for help, even though don't forget that he is busy.

(26a) Subordinate construction (*Even though* concessive construction)

(26b) Imperative construction

It will be argued below that while there is a potential conflict in construction both in (23) and in (25) in that the subordinate clause and the imperative are in principle incompatible with each other, this conflict is settled in (23) but unsettled in (25). The difference in acceptability will be attributed primarily to a difference between the loose (or more or less “coordinate-like”) syntactic integration of *though* vs. the extremely tight integration of *even though*, together with a difference in associated discourse function.

5.2 Why do concessive adverbial clauses allow imperatives both in rhetorical and ordinary use?

Let us begin our discussions by examining adverbials of concession within a broader perspective of clause combining. Classical studies of complex sentence structure assumed a

clear-cut divide between coordination and subordination. According to this traditional division, coordinate clause structure is an independent structure, whereas subordinate clause structure is dependent.

However, later studies found that clause linkage types should not be viewed as a binary opposition but rather forming a continuum, by closely examining not only Indo-European languages but also non-Indo-European languages as well as spoken data (cf. Matthiessen & Thompson 1988; Lehmann 1988; Langacker 1991; Hopper & Traugott 1993; Ohori 2000; Diessel 2001, among others). Hopper and Traugott (1993), for example, characterized the coordination/subordination continuum in terms of a “cline of clause combining,” with each clause combining structure elaborated by specification of the features \pm dependent, \pm embedded. This is illustrated in figure 1 (based on Hopper & Traugott 1993: 170):

parataxis	>	hypotaxis	>	subordination
–dependent		+ dependent		+ dependent
–embedded		–embedded		+ embedded

Figure 1. Hopper & Traugott’s “cline of clause combining”

According to Hopper and Traugott, the adverbial clause classifies as a case of hypotaxis, in which the relevant clause is “relatively independent” but not wholly included within any constituent of the nucleus (= main clause). Critically relevant here is Hopper and Traugott’s observation that adverbial clauses themselves show a continuum of looser-to-tighter integration, a continuum that correlates with their function (Hopper & Traugott 1993: 176; see also Ohishi 1976, 1977). In other words, some (adverbial) subordinate clauses can be symmetric in conceptual structure (cf. Verstraete 2005). In this regard, König’s (1994) following observation is particularly instructive. That is, the class of concessive adverbial *Constructions 2/2008* (www.constructions-online.de, urn:nbn:de:0009-4-12809, ISSN 1860-2010)

clauses, which cannot be focused (**only although/*It was although it was raining that Fred went out for a walk*), are less tightly integrated into a main clause than other types of adverbial clauses (ibid: 678).

I would like to argue that only concessive adverbial (excluding *even though*) clauses allow imperative constructions in ordinary as well as rhetorical use, because ordinary imperatives require a somewhat more independent linguistic environment than rhetorical imperatives, whereas concessive adverbials are capable of offering a more independent environment than reason adverbials such as *because*. In other words, the potential conflict between the subordinate clause and the imperative is settled provided that the former is realized with a concessive construction with *(al)though* or *except (that)*.

First, it may appear hard to prove that ordinary imperatives are conceptually more independent than rhetorical imperatives. However, the following fact serves as direct evidence. That is, ordinary imperatives cannot be deleted when they appear with concessive adverbials:

- (27a) We assume you have no intention of reporting your son, although if you are concerned about the children's welfare, *please reconsider*.
 (= (11) (ordinary imperative))
- ≠(27b) *We assume you have no intention of reporting your son, although if you are concerned about the children's welfare Ø.

In contrast, rhetorical imperatives in many (though not in all) cases can be deleted without seriously affecting the grammaticality or interpretation of the entire sequence:

- (28a) You should ask Harry for help, though *don't forget* that he is busy.
 (= (15a) [RHETORICAL IMPERATIVE])
- ≈ (28b) You should ask Harry for help, though Ø he is busy.
- (29a) The details don't matter much, except that *be aware* that all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

(= (14) [RHETORICAL IMPERATIVE])

≈ (29b) The details don't matter much, except that Ø all digital video output from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

Next, numerous studies suggest that concessive adverbial clauses are more independent of, and less integrated into, a main clause than other kinds of adverbial clauses (such as reason clauses) (cf. Rutherford 1970; König 1988, 1994; König & Siemund 2000, among others). First of all, concessive clauses cannot be the focus of a polar interrogative (cf. König 1994: 679):

(30a) Was he harassed because he was a journalist?

(30b) Was he harassed although he was a journalist?

Unlike the case of (30a) with *because*, the content of the *although* clause in (30b) cannot be questioned.

Second, concessive clauses tend to take maximal scope and are therefore not easily interpreted within the scope of a negative operator, as can be observed clearly in the following pair (König 1988: 149):

(31a) This house is no less comfortable because it dispenses with air-conditioning.

(31b) This house is no less comfortable, although it dispenses with air-conditioning.

(example 10 in König 1988)

Similarly, sentence (32b) below with *although* does not normally make sense, because, unlike the *because* clause in (32a), a concessive clause normally cannot be within the scope of negation:

(32a) She didn't marry him because he was rich.

(32b) ?She didn't marry him although he was poor.

Third, concessive clauses prefer a longer pause in cases like (33) below:

- (33a) Her not coming to class because she's sick hardly surprises anyone.
 (33b) Her coming to class(,) although she's sick(,) surprises everyone.

Sentence (33b) with an *although* clause requires a comma intonation, which is not necessarily the case with *because* in (33a).

In summary, the felicity of ordinary (= non-rhetorical) imperatives embedded under concessive adverbial clauses can be attributed to the latter's looser integration into, and hence semantic independence from, a main clause required by the former. The potential incompatibility in construction is averted.

5.3 Why do even though clauses tend to disallow imperatives?

The primary reason for this tendency resides, I suggest, in the fact that imperative constructions (or non-declaratives as a whole) are conceptually independent, whereas *even though* clauses are conceptually dependent compared with other concessive clauses. The imperative's conceptual independence (both in rhetorical and ordinary use) is evident from examples like those in (34) below:

- (34a) Your asking Harry for help (al)though he is busy (surprises every one).
 (34b) *Your asking Harry for help (al)though don't forget that he is busy (surprises everyone).
 [RHETORICAL IMPERATIVE]
 (34c) *We girls' having more clothes than we need (al)though don't tell my husband (hardly surprises anyone).
 [ORDINARY IMPERATIVE]

Quite unlike the declarative *he is busy* as in (34a), an imperative clause cannot occur within factual nominals, as illustrated by the ungrammaticality of both (34b) (in rhetorical use) and (34c) (in non-rhetorical use).

On the other hand, *even though* can be characterized in terms of conceptual dependence. Unlike other concessive adverbials, *even though* can readily be within the scope of question:

(35) Shall we go for a walk even though it does look like rain?

As Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 736) put it, the matrix in this example has interrogative force, suggesting that we should go for a walk, and this construction disallows *though* and *although*. Moreover, *even though* can be interpreted within a negative operator in the following construction, in which the *even though* clause acts as a subject nominal:

(36) Even though Arthur is a student does not entail Arthur is not a bank manager.
(BNC, FAC 1780)

In this respect, *even though* is similar in behavior to *just because*, which also constitutes this subject nominal:

(37) Just because Arthur is a student does not entail Arthur is not a bank manager.

Note that *although* cannot be used in this construction (cf. Hirose 1991):

(38) *Although Arthur is a student does not entail Arthur is not a bank manager.

It seems evident that *even though* clauses are a great deal more integrated into a main clause than other concessive adverbial clauses.

Next, there is a piece of evidence suggesting that *even though* clauses are actually more integrated into a main clause than *because* clauses. Consider example (30a) above, repeated here as (39a):

(39a) Was he harassed because he was a journalist?

It should be noted that the *because* clause here can be interpreted outside as well as inside the scope of a polar interrogative. In other words, *because* clauses can be not only dependent on a main clause but also independent of it. See that this is not the case with *even though*:

(39b) Was he harassed even though he was a journalist?

The only interpretation of *even though* here is within the scope of a polar interrogative – it seems hard to interpret *even though* outside the scope of this interrogative. In this regard, the degree of the *even though* clauses' integration (into a matrix clause) can be said to be quite high – higher than not only other concessive clauses but also reason (or more accurately, *because*) clauses. This extremely tight integration of *even though* clauses into a composite structure offers a succinct account of the difficulty of embedded imperatives (both in rhetorical and ordinary use) under *even though* clauses. Recall that, as we have observed in table 1, *because* permits rhetorical (though not ordinary) imperatives.

So far, we have examined the problems of subordinated imperatives in different concessive clauses mainly from the perspective of clausal integration. However, concession is of more than one kind. At this point, we need to take into consideration functional subtypes of concession, since the clausal integration of concessive clauses are at times closely associated with their functional subtypes. Previous studies on concession have proposed several different semantic subtypes of concessive adverbial clauses. Some adopt a two-level approach: “direct-rejection concessive” vs. “indirect-rejection concessive” (Azar 1997) or “direct concession” vs. “indirect concession” (Izutsu 2006). Others employ a three-level approach: “content,” “epistemic,” and “speech-act” (Sweetser 1990); and “standard,” “rhetorical,” or “rectifying” (König 1988, 1994). There are also studies applying a four-level approach: “content,” “epistemic,” “illocutionary level (= speech-

act),” as well as “text level” (Crevels 2000). It is revealed, for example, that the content-level use of concession is in general more tightly integrated into a main clause, while the illocutionary and the text-level uses are normally more loosely integrated, being sometimes expressed by asyndetic (= symmetric) means in some languages (cf. Crevels 2000).⁷

Despite all the impressive research, one serious problem arises if one attempts to characterize concessive adverbial clauses involving imperatives. Previous studies have based their classifications solely on cases where a concessive clause is occupied by a declarative; to the best of my knowledge, literally no study has analyzed cases where concessive clauses are occupied by non-declaratives. As a result, it is sometimes far from clear whether any of the proposed subtype(s) of concession truly captures the functional subtype(s) of concessive clauses occupied by an imperative. Nevertheless, I suggest that the notion of “rectifying concession” as discussed in König (1994) captures the type of concessive clauses with which imperatives preferentially combine due to their looser integration into a matrix clause.

According to König (1994: 681), the “rectifying concessive clause” can be characterized in terms of three features. Most importantly, whereas in the standard usage the content of the main clause is emphasized and highlighted, the content of the main clause is **weakened** whenever a rectifying concessive clause follows, as demonstrated below.

(40) Yes, it has come at last, the summons I know you have longed for. I, too, *though* it has come in a way I cannot welcome.

(example from König 1994: 681)

In this rectifying use, the *though* clause serves to weaken the content of the main clause *I (have longed for the summons) too*. König observes that this use can be found in many European languages, being marked by *although* and *though* in English and invariably

⁷ Several different labels have been employed to denote the semantic relation expressed by adverbials of concession: “concessive” (Quirk et al. 1985), “contrastive/adversative” (Halliday & Hasan 1976), “opposition” or “conflict/clash” (Sweetser 1990).

by *encore que* (as opposed to *quoique* or *bienque*) in French. There are close parallels in German as well. *Obwohl* is fine in the rectifying use, whereas the related conjunctions *obgleich* and *obschon* are of dubious acceptability.⁸ Second, rectifying concessive clauses always follow, but do not precede the main clause. Third, related to the first two features, rectifying clauses are only loosely linked to a main clause and typically exhibit main clause word order in languages like German, in which main and subordinate clauses are distinguished in terms of word order.

Of crucial importance here is König's remark that certain adverbial conjunctions, in particular those including *even though*, are not used in a rectifying function. That is, *even though* is invariably non-rectifying. As previous research reveals (cf. Crevels 2000), *even though* can be used for more than one function – not only for “content” or “direct-concession” or but also for “epistemic” and even “speech-act” or “indirect concession”. However, being independent of these functional subtypes, *even though* clauses invariably underscore the content of a main clause. Demonstrated below are the most common examples of *even though* used in actual discourse:

- (41a) It's a great feeling when a wild animal shows you affection, but **even though** she was born in captivity she'll always be a wild creature with the instincts of a killer.
(BNC, JYE 2973)
- (41b) It gave her the confidence to go out alone, **even though** walking was still difficult.
(BNC, ASO 1048)
- (41c) If your child finds reading difficult, don't provide books aimed at younger children because he may be bored by them **even though** he can understand them.
(BNC, CB8 3057)
- (41d) The effort of concealing her love was almost impossible **even though** it was imperative.
(BNC, FS1 2480)

⁸ I owe this information to a reviewer of this journal, who also comments that in German a break or pause between the concessive conjunction and the preceding and/or following part is a typical feature of the rectifying use.

To take an instance of (41a), the concessive clause *even though she was born in captivity* serves to highlight, by way of contrast, the content of its associated main clause *she'll always be a wild creature with the instincts of a killer*. See below that the assertion of this main clause will be diminished if this concessive clause is deleted:

(41a') It's a great feeling when a wild animal shows you affection, but Ø she'll always be a wild creature with the instincts of a killer.

Similarly in (41c), the *even though* clause strengthens the author's message that (one should not give one's child books aimed at younger children because) he may be bored. Compare the following sequence without this *even though* clause:

(41c') If your child finds reading difficult, don't provide books aimed at younger children because he may be bored by them Ø.

A closely parallel account holds for the other sentences in (41) as well. The same tendency can be seen in less standard usages as well:

(42) Even though this solution would be harmful to our enemies, the damage done to us would be even greater.

(example taken from Borkin 1980: 50ff, cited in König 1988: 148)

(43) Even though it's none of my business, I think your behavior is a disgrace.

According to König (1988: 148), the *even though* clause of (42) does not express any factual conflict, so this use might qualify as “dissonance of a rhetorical nature.” The fact remains, however, that the *even though* clause is being used to emphasize the content of its associated main clause. In the framework of Sweetser (1990) as well as Crevels (2000), (43) must be classified as a speech-act use of concession. Again, the sole purpose of the concessive clause with *even though* is to make remarkable the content of the main clause (*I think*) *your behavior is a disgrace*. Compare (44) below:

(44) Although it's none of my business, I think your behavior is a disgrace.

With this alternative version with *although*, the assertion of the main clause is hardly emphasized at all:

Given this restriction of *even though* to non-rectifying concession, we come up with the following generalization:

(45) When imperatives combine with concessive clauses, they strongly prefer those conveying a rectifying (rather than a non-rectifying) concession.

This tendency is intimately linked with, or motivated by, the more or less loose syntactic integration characteristic of the imperative (in both directive and assertive usage). The principle in (45) predicts the felicity of embedded imperatives under *though*, *although* and *except (that)* like those in (9), (10), (11), (12a)-(12e), (13a)-(13f) and (14) above, as well as the infelicity of embedded imperatives under the conjunction *even though* like those in (13a')-(13f'), (14b') and (15b).

In fact, the concessive clauses felicitously embedding imperatives never highlight, but invariably undermine, the assertion of an associated main clause. Let us look at some of the previous examples with concessive adverbials followed by ordinary (non-rhetorical) imperatives:

(46) You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, (= (13f)) well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle, **though** if your house burns down, *please don't write in*. Cedar (available as oil, chips, blocks, balls and drawer liners) is a classic repellent. Moth eggs are killed by tumble drying and dry cleaning.

(47) Johnson has always coached with that same sort of certitude. He worked at (= (12d)) Washington from 1989-92 under the difficult regime of Lynn Nance, a period of dark times for the Huskies – **except don't tell Johnson that**. He's fiercely loyal to Nance and says he learned more from him than anybody except Mike

Montgomery, his predecessor at Stanford.

In (46), it is clear that the concessive clause *though if your house burns down, please don't write in* weakens the author's assertion *I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle*. To see this, compare:

(46') You could place a bowl of soapy water beneath a lamp, attracting moths like, well, moths to a flame, then the soapy water drags them down. I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle Ø. Cedar (available as oil, chips, blocks, balls and drawer liners) is a classic repellent. Moth eggs are killed by tumble drying and dry cleaning.

In this version without the *though* clause, the assertion *I prefer an actual flame in the form of a candle* becomes stronger and more straightforward.

Similarly, the *except* clause in (47) weakens (part of) the assertion of its matrix clause. The immediately following discourse coheres more directly with the directive speech act of this concessive clause. It provides reasons why one should not tell Johnson that Lynn Nance is responsible for the "difficult regime" and 1989-92 was a period of dark times for the Huskies.

About the same can be said concerning rhetorical imperatives appearing with concessive adverbials – those imperatives are somewhat less tightly integrated into a composite structure than ordinary imperatives:

(48) You should ask Harry for help, though *don't forget* that he is busy.
(=(15a))

(49) The details don't matter much, except that *be aware* that all digital video output
(=(14)) from DVD players is protected by HDCP.

In (48), the *though* clause makes the suggestion of the main clause less emphatic; without it, the entire message would be far stronger and more clear-cut: *You should ask*

Harry for help Ø. Similarly in (49), the *except that* clause makes the statement of its main clause far less definite than a simpler construction such as *The details don't matter much* Ø.

In summary, there is a serious mismatch between *even though* and the imperative in both syntactic and functional terms. The *even though* clause serves solely to emphasize the content of a main clause (i.e. a non-rectifying concessive clause), whereas the imperative favors a concessive clause rectifying the content of a matrix clause.

6. Conclusion

The present paper has zeroed in on the possibility of subordinated imperatives under different concessive clauses. While Lakoff (1984) once proposed the view that clauses expressing reasons or concessions allow the imperative (and other kinds of speech act constructions) conveying statements, the paper has demonstrated that Lakoff's analysis is not perfectly supported by actual data.

The main points presented in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, contra Lakoff (1984) (as well as Verstraete 2005), reason and concessive clauses differ sharply in the kinds of imperative constructions they permit. Concessive clauses with *though*, *although*, and *except (that)* allow imperative constructions conveying ordinary (directive) force as well as assertive (rhetorical) force. Second, quite unlike other concessive clauses, *even though* tends to disallow the imperative construction.

I have offered an explanation for each of these findings from the perspective of compatibility between component constructions constituting a complex linguistic structure. The first finding, i.e., the compatibility between concessive conjunctions and imperatives, was attributed to the compatibility in terms of looser clausal integration into a matrix clause. The second finding, namely, the difficulty of imperatives under *even though* clauses and imperatives, was ascribed to the incompatibility in degrees of clausal integration, and the

related mismatch between the rectifying concession favored by imperatives and the non-rectifying concession of *even though*.⁹

In my analysis, I have argued that while one has to distinguish between reason and concessive adverbial clauses¹⁰, one also needs to differentiate between different concessive adverbial clauses. Concessive conjunctions (*al*)*though* and *except (that)* differ greatly from *even though* both in conceptual integration and associated discourse functions. I hope that the findings made here will stimulate further research on the possibility of embedding imperatives, the types of linking adverbial clauses with main clauses, the controversies about coordination and subordination, and Construction Grammar.

⁹ It is worth mentioning that what we are discussing here is varying degrees of conceptual integration of different adverbial clauses into a main clause. This should be distinguished from the possibility of syntactically independent occurrence, since almost all the adverbial clauses including conditionals can occur independently as in *If you can sign up here. Thank you.*

¹⁰ The non-prototypicality of concessive conjuncts as adverbial subordinators is pointed out in numerous works. Diachronically, concessive adverbial clauses develop relatively late, and developmentally, they are acquired later than other types of adverbial clauses (cf. König 1994: 679; Diessel 2004). As for the acquisition of English adverbials, the first conjunction that researchers found in spontaneous speech of young children is *and*, followed by *because*, *so*, *but*, and *when*, and conditional *if* clauses; coordinate *or* clauses, and temporal clauses marked by *while*, *since*, *after*, and *before* generally appear later. In contrast, *although* clauses do not occur at all in any of the corpora that have been examined. See Diessel (2004: 151) for a useful summary of previous studies on this subject.

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